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It all depends on your perspective: economic 
perceptions and the demography of voting in the 
Scottish Independence Referendum 
John Curtice, University of Strathclyde 
 
A lot closer than had seemed likely a few months previously; not as close in the end as the final 
SROOVKDGVXJJHVWHG7KDWSUREDEO\VXPPDULVHVPDQ\SHRSOH¶VUHDFWLRQZKHQWKH\OHDUQWWKDW
KDGYRWHG<HVDQG1RLQ6FRWODQG¶VLQGHSHQGHQFHUHIHUHQGXP. 
%XW6FRWODQGGLGQRWYRWHDVRQH9RWHUV¶SURSHQVLWLHVWRYRWH<HVRU1RYDULHGDFFRUGLQJWR
their social and economic circumstances. Not least of the reasons is that those circumstances 
affected their perceptions of the economic consequences of independence. 
Two polls of how people actually voted have been published so far. One was conducted on 
polling day by YouGov (via the internet) and consisted of interviews with 1,756 people who had 
DOVR SDUWLFLSDWHG LQ <RX*RY¶V ILQDO SUH-polling day poll, undertaken during the three days 
immediately before 18 September 2014. To their reports of how they had just voted were added 
the reported voting behaviour of 783 people who had previously told YouGov that they had 
already voted by post.  The results of this exercise were first published shortly after the polls 
closed at 10pm on polling day and it forecast that 46% had voted Yes, and 54% No, only one 
point apart from the actual result. 
 
Figure 1: The Scottish Independence Referendum ± 
Gender Gap: % of men and women voting Yes 
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The second poll, commissioned by Lord Ashcroft, was conducted on polling day and the day 
DIWHU,QWKLVFDVHVRPHUHVSRQGHQWVZHUHLQWHUYLHZHGE\µSKRQHRWKHUVRQOLQH
giving a grand total of 2,047 interviewees.  In this poll the data were weighted, so that the overall 
proportion who said that they voted Yes and No reflects the actual result. 
Between them, the two polls uncover three clear patterns, patterns that in each case had long 
been anticipated by pre-polling day opinion polls. First, as Figure 1 shows, women were less 
likely than men to vote Yes. According to YouGov, 51% of men voted Yes but only 42% of 
ZRPHQ7KLVILJXUHLVTXLWHFORVHWRWKHSDWWHUQLQWKHILQDOSROOVRQDYHUDJHHDFKFRPSDQ\¶V
final poll pointed to a 51YRWHDPRQJVWPHQDPRQJVWZRPHQ$VKFURIW¶VSROOVXJJHVWV
that the gender gap was rather narrower, with 47% of men voting Yes and 44% of women. But 
taking into account the vagaries of sampling error it is at least possible that a majority of men 
voteG<HVDQGWKDW6FRWODQG¶VGHFLVLRQWRVWD\LQWKH8QLRQUHVWHGRQWKHVXSSRUWJLYHQWRWKH
No camp by women. 
 
Figure 2A: The Scottish Independence Referendum ± 
Age Gap (1): % voting Yes, by age group 
 
* Source: Ashcroft Polls 
 
 
Second, older people were less keen on the idea of independence than younger people.  
According to Ashcroft (see Figure 2A), the age gap was particularly stark, with just 29% of those 
aged 65 plus saying that they voted Yes, whereas a little over half of those aged under 55 
backed independence. YouGov suggest that the age gap was not quite that stark, but even so 
still found that only around a third of those aged 65 and over voted Yes, whereas support for 
independence amongst the under 60s as a whole might have been only just short of 50%. This 
age gap has led to some speculation that perhaps there might be a majority for independence 
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LQVD\ WZHQW\\HDUV¶ WLPHZKHQWKHFXUUHQWJHQHUDWLRQRIROGHUSHRSOH LVQR ORQJHUZLWKXV
However, we should note that both polls suggest that support for independence was highest 
amongst those in their late twenties and thirties rather than amongst the very youngest group 
of voters aged 16-24. So perhaps we should not necessarily assume that future generations of 
voters will necessarily evince the same degree of enthusiasm for independence that is currently 
in evidence amongst those aged between 25 and 55. 
 
Figure 2B: The Scottish Independence Referendum ±  
Age Gap 2: % voting Yes, by age group* 
 
    * Source: YouGov 
 
 
Third, those living in less affluent circumstances were more likely than those who are living 
more comfortably to vote Yes.  According to YouGov, 50% of those who market researchers 
FODVVLI\ DV µ&'(V¶ WKDW LV WKRVH ZKR DUH RU ZKR ZHUH HQJDJHG LQ PDQXDO µworking-FODVV¶
occupations, or who are now primarily dependent on the state for their income, voted Yes. In 
FRQWUDVWVXSSRUWDPRQJVWWKRVHFDWHJRULVHGDVµ$%&V¶SULPDULO\WKRVHLQZKLWHFROODUµPLGGOH
FODVV¶MREVVWRRGDWRQO\7KLVFODVVJDSLVWhough, bigger than that found on average in 
the final polls, where support for Yes again stood at 50% amongst C2DEs, but at 44% amongst 
ABC1s. Ashcroft also has a rather lower estimate of the gap, with only 47% of C2DEs supporting 
Yes and 44% of ABC1s. 
However, this binary division of Scots into two large classes undoubtedly underestimates the 
extent to which economic circumstance influenced the way that people voted. A much sharper 
pattern was uncovered by Ipsos MORI when in two polls they conducted just before polling day 
they classified their respondents according to the level of deprivation in their neighbourhood. 
As Figure 3 shows, a clear majority of those living in the most deprived parts of Scotland (as 
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measured by the Scottish Index of Multiple Deprivation) voted in favour of independence, 
whereas only around only two-fifths of those living in the most affluent did so. 
These patterns were also evident in the geography of the vote as revealed by the results in 
HDFKRI6FRWODQG¶VORFDOFRXQFLODUHDV. In the one-third or so of council areas with the highest 
levels of unemployment, on average 51% voted Yes. In contrast, the Yes vote averaged just 
39% in the places with the lowest levels of unemployment. Equally, in the one-third of council 
areas with the highest proportion of people living in one of the 15% most deprived 
neighbourhoods in the country, on average 51% voted Yes, compared with 40% amongst those 
areas with the fewest living a multiply deprived neighbourhood. 
 
Figure 3: The Scottish Independence Referendum Deprivation Gap:  
% voting Yes, by degree of neighbourhood deprivation (SIMD*) 
 
* SIMD ( Scottish Index of Multiple Deprivation)       
Source: Calculated from Ipsos MORI polls 15-16.9 & 16-17.9 
 
 
The Yes vote was also higher in places with a relatively young population. In those council 
areas with relatively few people aged 65 and over, on average 47% voted Yes, whereas only 
39% did so in those areas with the highest proportions of such voters. 
It is thanks to these patterns that, despite its historical association with the Labour party, 
Clydeside together with Dundee provided the four areas where a majority did vote in favour of 
independence.  Glasgow, North Lanarkshire, West Dunbartonshire and Dundee are amongst 
the six council areas with the highest unemployment count and the highest proportions of 
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people living in a deprived neighbourhood. At the same time, all four areas contain relatively 
low proportions of people aged 65 or over. 
But why did these demographic differences and geographical patterns arise?  One hypothesis 
that suggests itself is that those who were less well-off felt that they had relatively little to lose 
financially and indeed might have been inclined to hope that independence would bring about 
an improvement in their lot. Older people, meanwhile, might have been more likely to feel that 
independence posed an economic risk that they as pensioners could not afford to take. 
$IWHU DOO SHRSOH¶V HYDOXDWLRQV RI WKH HFRQRPLF FRQVHTXHQFHV DUH NQRZQ WR KDYH SOD\HG D
central role in whether they opted to vote Yes or No (Curtice, 2014). According to the 2014 
Scottish Social Attitudes survey, conducted between May and August 2014, no less than 92% 
of those who thought that the economy would be better under independence said that they 
intended to vote Yes rather than No. In contrast, just 6% of those who reckoned the economy 
would be worse under independence stated that they would vote in favour of leaving the UK. 
ICM uncovered much the same pattern when in the polls it conducted each month they asked 
ZKHWKHULQGHSHQGHQFHZRXOGEHJRRGRUEDGIRU6FRWODQG¶VHFRQRP\ 
 
Table 1:  Perceptions of the economic consequences of Independence,  
by gender, age group and social class (by %) 
 
«E\ 
 
Better off Worse off 
No difference/ 
'RQ¶WNQRZ 
Gender 
 
   
Men 
 41 43 17 
Women 
 30 51 19 
Age group 
 
   
16-24 
 37 44 19 
25-39 
 40 40 21 
40-59 
 37 45 17 
60-64 
 35 48 17 
65+ 
 26 59 15 
Social grade 
 
   
ABC1 
 32 51 16 
C2DE 
 38 43 19 
 
Source: YouGov 15 -17 September 2014 
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These perceptions did vary significantly from one demographic group to another. As Table 1 
shows, older voters were markedly less likely than younger voters to think that Scotland would 
µHFRQRPLFDOO\EHWWHURII¶LILWEHFDPHDQLQGHSHQGHQWFRXQWU\7KHVDPe is true, if less starkly, 
of ABC1 as opposed to C2DE voters.  Here again, however, a rather sharper picture emerges 
if we look at how perceptions varied according to the character of the area in which someone 
lived. According to the Scottish Social Attitudes survey, amongst those living in one of the one-
ILIWKPRVWGHSULYHGQHLJKERXUKRRGV LQ6FRWODQGWKRXJKW6FRWODQG¶VHFRQRP\ZRXOGEH
better under independence, almost as many as the 34% who thought it would be worse.  In 
contrast amongst those living in one of one-fifth most affluent parts of the country, only 24% 
thought the economy would be better while as many as 54% felt it would be worse.  
6RLWORRNVDVWKRXJKSHRSOH¶VYLHZVRIWKHHFRQRPLFFRQVHTXHQFHVRILQGHSHQGHQFHGHSHQGHG
on the perspective from which they were looking. For those living in less well-off circumstances 
and for younger people, the economic prospects under independence looked brighter than they 
did for those who were better off and were older. For all the complex debate about currency 
union, the prospects for North Sea Oil, and the future of labour market productivity, the debate 
about the economics of independence was in truth in part at least an argument about whose 
interests might or might not be best served by changing the FRXQWU\¶VFRQVWLWXWLRQDOVWDWXV- and 
thus was an argument that reflected some of the social divisions in Scottish society. 
That, of course, still leaves us with one other pattern to consider ± the gender gap.  For, as our 
Table shows, it appears that the gender gap also reflected different perceptions of the 
HFRQRPLFV RI LQGHSHQGHQFH  +RZHYHU LW LV OHVV REYLRXV ZK\ ZRPHQ¶V FXUUHQW HFRQRPLF
circumstances should lead them to come a different perspective (or at least a less favourable 
one) on independence than did men.  Perhaps here a different psychology came into play ± 
certainly women were more inclined to say that the consequences of independence were all 
rather uncertain (Ormston, 2014). Or maybe women just proved to be a lot more hard-headed 
than men? 
Despite the best efforts of professional economists to lay out what the implications of a Yes or 
No vote might be, in practice voters were faced in the referendum with a choice between two 
uncertain futures. Nobody could be entirely sure what the economic consequences of 
independence or remaining in the Union might be. Against that backdrop we should not be 
VXUSULVHG WKDWSHRSOH¶VHYDOXDWLRQVRI WKRVHFRQVHTXHQFHV ZHUH LQIOXHQFHGE\ WKHLU FXUUHQW
circumstances and psychology, and that as a result who voted which way reflected some of the 
social divisions in Scottish society. After all, those were a present reality, not part of an unknown 
future. 
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